
























at   outlawing   racism   and   prosecuting   perpetrators   of   racist   violence.   The   Government 
established working groups and specialised units in its bodies that were entrusted with putting 
an   end   to   racism   in   the   society.   In   November   2009   Parliament   of   Ukraine   adopted 





Soviet   Union.   However,   I   identified   that   racism   in   Ukrainian   society   was   triggered   and 
perpetuated by the recent discourse on migration, which is a universal phenomenon in the 
modern world and is particularly actualised in the West. Within this discourse settings that 
legitimized   and   normalised   symbolic   and   physical   violence   against   members   of   visible 






























































started   reluctantly   recognizing   the   existent   racism.   Some   steps   were   undertaken   by   the 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) of Ukraine, including assigning specialised units throughout the 
structure of MoI, raising awareness among police officers on the activities of neo­Nazi sub­
cultural   formations   in   Ukraine   and   creating   specific   forms   that   were   thought   to   ensure 
adequate documentation of racist  crimes.  In addition  to  this,  an Inter­Ministerial  Working 
Group devoting its efforts to strategic planning of actions of authorities aimed at countering 
racism  in  Ukrainian   society  was  established.    Moreover,  upon   the   insistence  of   the   civil 
society,   amendments   to   the  Criminal  Law of  Ukraine  were  adopted  aimed  at  harshening 
liability for perpetuation of racist crimes. 
















the   problem   they   aim   to   counteract,   civil   society   are   overlooking   some   vital   aspects 
















Ukraine,   1994­2008;   Panina,   2003).   In   particular,   the   majority   has   been   increasingly 
distancing   itself   from   those   who   it   perceived   to   belong   to   following   ethnic   groups: 
Azerbaijani, Armenians, Uzbeks, Tadzhyks, Turks (at the edge of isolation in 2009) as well as 
Arabs, Chinese, Africans, Roma, Chechens (highest levels of isolation in 2009). As one can 
see,   all   of   the   listed   'ethnic'   categories   are  popularly   perceived  as   'non­white',  which,  of 
course,  does not necessarily correspond with reality.  The term ‘visible minority’ does not 








Crimean   Tartars   by   specialised   institutions   such   as   European   Roma   Rights   Centre 
(www.errc.org), Union of Councils for Jews in the former Soviet Union (www.uscj.org) and 




minorities'   were   concentrated   on   monitoring   the   number   of   violent   attacks   against   their 
members   motivated   by   racism   (Likhachev   2008,   Butkevych,   2007; 
www.xenodocuments   .org.ua   ). Several efforts of analytical research pertaining to some of the 











will  only attempt  to outline those factors,  which were identified in  its course as the most 














trigger   and   legitimise   racism   in   Ukrainian   society   through   analysis   of   dominant   public 








also   clear   that   to   enhance   the   effect   of   anti­racist   initiatives   more   in­depth   research   is 










just   ideological  constructs   (Miles  & Brown,  2003:  4).  Despite   this,  and   the   fact   that   the 
concept of  'race' has been the central element to racist ideology which during past several 































is   suggested   by   the   psychological   perspective,   accentuates   the   importance   of   social   and 
historical conditions in which personality of an individual develops (2003: 2472). 
However,   among   modern   scholars   of   racism   dominates   an   opinion   that,   although 
individualistic explanations of racism are useful, racism as a form of group domination   (or 
‘symbolic   violence’:   Žižek,   2008),   cannot   exist   in   one   isolated   mind   and   therefore 




reproduced and maintained   through stereotypes   that  are  perpetrated  structurally   (O'Byrne, 










2009;  Butkevych,  2009;  Likhachev,  2008;  Likhachev 2010).  The dominant  explanation  of 





substantially   improved   in   comparison   with   the   1990s.   Some   of   the   proponents   of   this 
economic explanation also de­construct it themselves demonstrating that in reality there is no 





it   as   elements   of   material   reality.   On   the   contrary,   I   relied   herein   on   post­structuralist 
perspective, which dominates current Western scholarly discourse on racism. 
Even   within   this   perspective   there   is   no   uniform   definition   of   racism.   There   exists, 
however, a consensus that racism is  primarily  an ideology that  manifests  itself in different 
ways,   including racist  practices  and discourses (Miles & Brown, 2003: 9).   In  this  context 








In   this   context   the   insight   of  P.  Essed   into   the   interaction  between  macro   and  micro 
dimensions of   racism is  of particular   importance.  She suggested  that   racism constitutes  a 
system of structural inequalities and historical processes produced through routine processes. 
However, structures of racism do not exist independently of agents, but are created by them. 
She   argues   that   in   light   of   this   dichotomy   both   individual   and   institutional   racism   gain 
legitimacy for research (Essed, 1993: 36­39). P. Essed also identified three basic processes 
structuring   racism   that   mutually   stimulate   and   sustain   each   other.   The   first   of   them, 
marginalisation, she defines as a process in which the sense of 'otherness' is perpetuated. The 
second  element  of   this   process   is  problematisation,  which   stands   for   the  discourses   that 





























individuals   who   find   themselves   in   the   position   of   temporary   advantage   to   strive   to 
consolidate   their   fortune   by   means   of   exclusion   of   those   who   are   (perceived   as) 
disadvantaged. In doing so they produce disparities in the concentration of wealth and power. 
However,   the  designation  as   to  who  is  disadvantaged   is   largely  a  product  of   imagination 
structured by culture and associated ideologies (from Fardon, 1999: 136). 







emphasis   is   made   here   on   ensuring   representativeness   and   validating   finding,   due   to 
exploratory nature of this research. The following methodical approaches were applied in this 
research. 
In   the   light  of   the  preferred   theoretical  perspective   in  order   to  meet   the   set   research 
objectives I chose critical discourse analysis as the main methodological approach for this 
study. It allowed identifying the topics around which racist discourse within the dominant 
elite   discourse   circulates   as   well   as   to   characterise   development   of   racist   discourse   in 
Ukrainian society and identify the factors that triggered escalation of exclusionary attitudes 
and practices of the majority against  'visible minorities’. It also permitted to analyse what 
discursive   constructions   have   served   to   marginalise,   stigmatise   and   suppress   'visible 
minorities'. 










In  light  of   the virtual  absence of   the research devoted  to  the mechanisms with which 
racism is perpetuated, reproduced and maintained in Ukrainian society, I had to heavily rely 
on primary data. These included a range of interviews with different stakeholders, including 
members  of   'visible  minorities',   civil­society  experts,  police,  members  of  general  public; 
personal  observation  notes  made during  2006­2008;   relevant   statements  of   state  officials 











the fall  of   the Iron Curtain  the system of values   that  had been forcefully  imposed on  its 






was   the   total   collapse   of   the   economy   and   consequent   impoverishment   of   the   country's 
population   at   large   that  was  mitigated  only  by   the  very   end  of   1990s.  Furthermore,   the 
collapse of the ideological system of coordinates and delimitation of the borders of the new 
independent  state  redirected and  intensified processes of re­conceptualization of collective 
identities among people vis a vis each other and the world 'abroad'.
Leadership   of   the   country   (former   Communist   Party   functionaries,   who   now   called 
themselves democrats) steered it and its population into the new life. The course was taken at 










as   a   bitter   offence  by   another   equally   substantial   one.  Bitterness   of   that   other   part   also 
extended one way or another to the very fact of the independence of Ukraine.






























what was officially called  advancement,  culturalisation  and  Sovietisation  of the population 
within the 'friendship of the peoples' was taken by many as a policy of Russification. 
Process  of  creation  of   ‘Soviet  people’  was  facilitated by a  number  of  demographic  or 
economic policies. These included measures ranging from encouraging voluntary migration to 
extermination  of   ‘enemy classes’   in  which  on  some occasions  ethnicity  allegedly  plaid  a 
significant role in defining individual class belonging. Thus, artificial famine of 1932­1933 





authorities   to   facilitate   collectivisation   in   agricultural   sector   targeted   villages   within   the 
territories where majority of rural population spoke Ukrainian and is believed by some to be 
an act of genocide against Ukrainian ethnic group (Mace, 1990). While implementing other 
repressive   ‘demographic’   measures   Soviet   authorities   were   more   outspoken   about   the 
presence   of   ‘ethnic   factor’   in   them.   During   1940   and   1950   Soviet   authorities   forcefully 
displaced a range of smaller ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. Ethnic minority groups 
almost completely removed and banned for a while from the territory of Ukraine included 
Crimean   Tatars,   Armenians,   Bulgarians,   Greeks,   Italians,   Crimean   Roma   and   Germans. 
Authorities   accused   thousands   of   people   perceived   to   belong   to   these   ethnic   groups   in 
sympathising  with   “German­Fascist  occupants”   solely  on   the  basis  of   their   ethnicity   and 





discourse   and   by   political   elites   against   Crimean   Tartars   and   Ukrainians.   Similarly   the 
symbolism of the Great Patriotic War still plays an important role in defining ‘absolute good’ 




behave  in  political  sphere of   their   lives.  Both  the  dogmas  imposed by  the  official  Soviet 
ideology and the trauma inflicted by their practical consequences on the collective memory of 
the  population   co­exist   and   interact   in  mutual   rejection   (see  Bauman,   1998:   126   for   the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘rejection’) tearing apart the population, which is otherwise 
largely homogenous, and most importantly, individual minds. ‘Russian’ and ‘Ukrainian’ have 
simply   become   symbols   signifying   which   of   the   two   systems   of   coordinates   prevails   in 








advancement   in   'ethnic   status'  was  not  possible.  For  example  V.  Tishkov during  his   field 
research in 1990 in the Ust'­Ordynski Buryat autonomous district (modern Russia) observed 
that  Buryats   there were “strongly acculturated  into Russian culture”,  all   spoke Russian  at 
home and only few could can speak Buryat but yet according to 1989 census 90% of them 
called Buryat   their  native tongue.  One of his   informants  explained  it   to   the researcher  as 
follows:  “I  do not   feel   it   is  proper   to  show Russian as our  native  language when we are 
Buryats. We will never be Russians because we look different” (1997: 88). 
Ethnic   groups   'who   looked   different'   formed   the   bottom   of   the   implicit   hierarchy   of 
nationalities within the Soviet Union. In the popular and even official language used in the 







domination   by   civilizationist   rhetoric.   They   believed   that   they  brought   civilization  and 
economically  developed  'visible  majorities'  whom  they  dominated   (personal   conversations 














popular   language and is  still  used as  generic  names for people with dark skin and  imply 
























































awareness of  it   (for example ECRE, 2009: 87).  Also because experiences of racism differ 
depending on personal characteristics of members of ‘visible minorities’ (such as legal status, 
language capacity, tone of the skin colour) as well as depending on the region of Ukraine 
where   they   reside.   For   example,   the   most  bitter   complaints  about   proliferation   of   racist 
attitudes among the population of Ukraine where expressed by those respondents who lived in 
the   capital   (Kyiv).   The   situation   in   regional   centres   seemed   to   be   somewhat   better. 
Furthermore,  many of   the ECRE respondents originating from Caucasus  and Middle East 





































treated   by   the   relevant   officials   that   their   applications   would   be   rejected   without   due 
consideration because their skin colour (ECRE, 2009: 81 and 85). 











who   are   not   conceptualised   as   ‘alien’.   It   is   ‘visible   minorities’   whom   the   majority 
automatically presumes to be ‘irregular economic migrants’ (Ibid.; personal notes, 2008).














Having   outlined   the   main   forms   in   which   ‘visible   minorities’   experience   racism   in 
Ukraine both practically and discursively I shall now proceed with identifying the factors that 
have structured the environment of racism they find themselves in. For this on the basis of the 
conclusions  of   this   sub­section   I  will  attempt   to   locate  and de­construct   racist  discourses 




















beyond   the   contemporary   borders   of   Ukraine   before   the   collapse   of   the   Soviet   Union 
(majority)   or   thereafter.   In   this   sub­section   I   analyse   the  official   and  popular   discourses 
surrounding members of ‘visible minorities’ who were considered as part of the permanent 
population  of  Ukraine   for   the  purposes   of   the   last   population   census   (2001).  Permanent 
population for its purposes covered citizens and foreign nationals or stateless persons who 





According   to   the   results  of   the   census  out  of   approximately  48  million  of  permanent 
population   only   around   272,000   (0.57%)   self­identified   with   ethnic   groups   popularly 
perceived as different in phenotype from the majority. Among them 74% identified themselves 






Among  those  permanently   resident   'visible  minorities'  who are  non­citizens   the   largest 
group (68%)  identified  themselves  with   'ethnic groups'  originating from Caucasus  region. 
17% ­ South and South East Asia, 10% ­ Middle East, and 5% ­ Middle Asia. Together they 




Although   ‘Russians’   constitute   almost   a   half   of   ‘permanently’   resident   non­nationals, 
among the total number of those who consider themselves Russian in Ukraine only 1% are not 
holders  of  Ukrainian  passports.   In   fact   even  among  presumable   ‘visible  minorities’   ratio 
between citizens and non­nationals depends the region of origin. In 2001 among minorities 
originating   from   Middle   Asia,   encompassing   some   regions   of   South   Russia   and   former 
Middle Asian Soviet Republics only 10% were not Ukrainian citizens. 19% of individuals who 






small.  However,   it   appears   that   not  only   legal  norms  governing  acquisition  of  Ukrainian 














The   interviewee  with  her   intonation   stressed   'even  Russians'  while   her   tone   remained 
neutral when she listed 'Azerbaijanis' and 'Armenians’, as if she implied that on the one hand 
the fact that latter two categories were subject to such a treatment was regrettable, but not 




Furthermore,   in   the   census   results  one  cannot  overlook   the  precarious  category   'other 
nationalities'   that   appears   there   in   addition   to  130   specifically   listed   'ethnic  groups'.  The 
number listed under this category is insignificant in the total population. I was not able to 
access any sources as to what ‘ethnic’ groups are listed as ‘other nationalities’ therefore this 
category was not reflected in the above calculations.  It,  nonetheless,  seems remarkable as 
form of the discourse pertaining to ‘visible minorities’ for the following reasons. 







necessary   to   reflect   categories   associated   with   ‘non­traditional’   and  presumable   ‘visibly’ 

















  According   to   the  data  of   the  MoI  of  Ukraine   in  2009 111,600  foreign  nationals  and 
stateless persons were temporarily registered in Ukraine (both at MoI departments within the 
country or by filling in a migration card at the border). Among them, the vast majority were 









Further  42,600 of  ‘temporary immigrants’   registered  in 2009 came/or  were staying for 
university   education   (Ibid.).  After  1991,  Ukraine  continued  a   tradition  established  by   the 


















authority  and perhaps  many others  consider  people   from the   listed  countries  as  actual  or 
potential ‘illegal migrants’ in/passing Ukraine. I will leave this thesis aside, to consider later, 
after discussing other statuses, which members of 'visible minorities' may have in Ukraine. 
An   important,   although   not   too   large,   component   in   the   composition   of   immigrant 
population constitute those who were forced to leave their countries of origin. As of 1 January 
2010   since   independence   of   Ukraine   the   authorities   “have   considered   23,260   asylum 
applications (0.05% of total population in 2001) and granted refugee status to 5 693 persons, 
or to every fourth applicant (SCNR, 2010)”. Some of the refugees recognised as such by the 
authorities   have   now   left   Ukraine   and   many   have   acquired   Ukrainian   citizenship.   On   1 
January  2010  there  were  2,334  recognized   refugees   residing   in  Ukraine.  The  majority  of 
recognized refugees  came from Afghanistan,  over  a   third ­   from post­Soviet countries,   in 







Protocol   (1967)   in  2002,   1993  Law was   replaced  by   the  new one  adopted   in   2001.  The 





















2002.   Endless   subsequent   reforms   of   institutional   framework   of   asylum   undoubtedly 
continued to hinder access of individuals to RSD. Still one cannot help wondering why the 

























is eligible for  international protection and, consequently,  legal,  interpretation and other types of services 
available from UNHCR partner­NGOs for the purposes of assisting asylum seekers in going through national 































































increasingly   frequent   throughout   the   country,   claim   that   “During   recent   years   around   7 




among whom maximum of,  as  estimated,  1.6  millions  (more  than  in  any other  European 
Country) were undocumented. Both local (O. Poznyak of Institute on Demographic Research 
of National Academy of Science of Ukraine at TSN, 2009) and international (Pylynsky, 2009; 
Düvell   and  Vollmer,   2009)   experts   indicate   that   these   figures   seriously   falsify   reality.   It 
appears  that   the methodology used by  the World Bank experts   to  arrive  to both of   these 







for   their   compilation   is   official   statistics   by   Ukrainian   authorities   on   a   number   of 
30
undocumented migrants identified by them (through in­country identification, on the border 
apprehensions on­exit and on entry) (Düvell  and Vollmer,  2009.:  16­17 and 20­21). These 
data, however, shall also be treated with caution (Ibid.: 16). 
Let us briefly examine them (see Annex II as well as Düvell and Vollmer, 2009: 19; and 






(see research by  the COMPAS [Düvell  and Vollmer,  2009]  and UNHCR [Uehling,  2004] 
experts for a detailed discussion of this problem). Among the factors influencing the number 

























course   of   their   ‘fight   against   illegal   migration’   against   members   of   vulnerable   groups, 
particularly those nominally called here 'visible minorities' (see UNHCR, 2007; HRW, 2005; 
AI, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; ECRE 2007; Düvell, 2008; Düvell, 2008; Levin, 2006; ECRI, 2008; 















legally  entitled   to   such  documentation.  Majority  of   them self­identify  with  ethnic  groups 












In   the attempt  to  identify   the root­causes  of   the problem I will   rely on  the theoretical 
perspectives  outlined   in   the   introduction   to   this  paper,  one  of  which  views   racism as  an 
essential element or a counter­part of nationalism and another argues that racism has its roots 






As  illustrated  above  that   racism  in Ukraine   in   its  current   form appears   to  be  a   recent 
phenomenon arising around the turn of the millennia. Its occurrence manifested itself most 
notably  in   the  surge of   racist  violence,   reports  of  which started penetrating   informational 
space since the end of 2006 (AI, 2008a; ECRI, 2008). Some local experts, however, note that 
incidents   of   racist   violence,   including   perpetrated   by   neo­Nazi   sub­cultural   formations, 
occurred in Ukraine even earlier (KhPG, 2009; Butkevych, 2007; UNHCR, 2001). UNCHR, 
for   example,  documented   such  incidents,   including  violence,   since  2001   (UNHCR,  2001; 
Portnikov, 2006).
Another  manifestation  of   raising   intolerance  against   'visible  minorities'  was  a  growing 






management'.  Among  other,   as   demonstrated  above  a   rapid  decline  of   the  percentage  of 
refugees who were offered protection occurred in 2002. Institutionalised racism also occurred 
as   systematic   harassment   of   members   of   'visible   minority'   groups   by   Ukrainian   law 
enforcement  authorities.  Complains  concerning  'ethnic profiling'  were first  documented  in 
2001 (Braichevska, 2001) though, the practice might have started earlier. Since 2007 one of 
the most salient concerns expressed by 'visible minorities' with regard to the practices of law 
enforcement   authorities   in   Ukraine   had   been   their   reluctance   to   adequately   address 
33
discrimination and racist violence (Pylynsky, 2009). 
  Thus,   through   the   outline   of   practical   manifestations   of   racism   the   timeframe   of 
occurrence of its current form was confirmed, consequently one shall look for discoursive 
manifestations of racism against ‘visible minorities’ within the estimated period. But first it is 






started   articulating   openly   racist   ideas   directed   against   ‘visible   minorities’ 
(www.svoboda.org.ua  and   www.forum.vosvoboda.info).   Even   mainstream   political   parties, 
which declared their sympathies with Ukrainian nationalism, relied on anti­Semitic sentiments 
of the population to discredit their opponents (Kuzio, 2010). Several incidents when high­rank 
politicians   associated   with   them   made   racist   statements   against   ‘visible   minorities’   were 
reported by the media (see Korotkov, 2008). Moreover, pro­Russian, side of political spectrum 
claims that Ukrainian nationalism, as opposed to Russian,  is ‘inherently racist,  fascist and 





forms   of   ‘ethnic’   intolerance.   The   mainstream   movements   sympathising   with   Ukrainian 
nationalist ideas since then have always tried to deconstruct this accusations and prove the 
opposite through condemnation of all forms of racism (see for example Podrobnosti, 2008; 
BEK, 2007).  The main  ‘Other’  against  whom Ukrainian  ‘ethnic   identity’   is  articulated   is 
Russia and the diversion of the Ukrainian nationalist discourse from this ‘Other’ appears to 
many counter­intuitive.  Hence,  many  local  experts  believe  that   the  current  surge of   racist 
violence and proliferation of neo­nazi ideology among youth has nothing to do with Ukrainian 
nationalism  as   such   and  has   been   orchestrated   by  Ukraino­phobic   forces   (KhPG,   2009). 
Certainly, one cannot deny that political insinuations might have contributed to the current 











Notably,   although   neo­nazi   groupings   in   Ukraine   may   have   certain   ideological 







nationalisms   and   racism   against   ‘visible   minorities’   in   Ukraine   may   not   be   excluded, 
nationalist discourses were not decisive in triggering racism. It is suggested that the main topic 
around which racist discourses are concentrated is  'migration management'. It also appears 
that   the   discourse   around   this   topic   'migration   management'   is   what   perpetuates   and 
legitimises institutionalised and everyday racism as well as racist violence. 
During   field   research   in  December  2009,   I   conducted  a   series  of   interviews  with   lay 
inhabitants of Kyiv (5 persons) and Odesa (5 persons) to test my above thesis. One group was 
asked to “characterise the climate of inter­ethnic relations in Ukraine” (5 persons) and another 


















[circumstances   of   the   attack]...So,   they   saw   him...   […]  They   asked   if   he   had   a   registration... 
Nonetheless, they immediately started beating him... 













around  1500  foreigners  who  are  permanently   registered  or  otherwise   staying  here...  They  may  be 




























perpetuates   and   legitimises   racism   against   ‘visible   minorities’   is   located   in   rhetoric 




scrutiny the development of  the dominant  discourse on migration management within  the 
identified timeframe. I consider that it can be traced through analysis of rhetoric of political 
elites,   as   elite   discourses   not   only   reflect   the   dominant   public   discourse,   but   also   to   a 
substantial degree structure it. For that I will use the relevant legislative initiatives and the 
parliamentary debates surrounding them as source of the elite discourse. 
The   first  domestic  normative   initiative   to  mention   the   term  'illegal  migration'  was   the 
Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) of 1996, followed by another CMU 
























protection  of  national   security”   (Ibid.).  Deputy   I.Khmara  of  Block  of  Yulia  Tymoshenko 
(BYT), the opposition, decided to stress that [without strengthening the borders] (Ibid.):











western border our  glorious border guards stop them [and detain them] in camps19.  They protest   there, 
because conditions are inhuman. One has to treat humanely  even illegals.  On the expense of our miser 
budget [...] border guards are keeping this illegal migrants in those camps, but they are protesting, as it was 




One   can   observe   from   the   above   (see   Krzyżanovsky   and   Wodak,   2009   for   more 
information  on  the  applied  methodology of  critical  discourse  analysis)  how interaction  of 








perpetuate   its   problematisation,   but   also   create   a   sense   of   'otherness'   thus,   perpetuating 
marginalisation of 'visible minorities' (Essed, 1991: 114­115). 















































into   force   upon   the   adoption   of   the   European   Council   and   Commission   Decision 
No.98/149/EC   of   26   January   1998.   Shortly   after   European   Council   adopted   a   Common 
Strategy on Ukraine No.199/877/CFSP of 11 December 1999. These framework instruments 
further developed into the detailed framework of international cooperation between EC/EU 




















on   lobbying  the  Government   to   take  legislative  and practical  measures  aimed eradicating 






of All  Forms of Racial  Discrimination (CERD, 1965) submitted to  the respective UN 
Committee in 2005 the Government stated: “All forms of discrimination based on race 
and nationality have been eliminated in Ukraine” (CERD, 2006a, Para 83: 15). They also 









representatives  of  Amnesty International   (AI)   in  June 2008 devoted  to   the surge of  racist 
violence in Ukraine (AI, 2008a) suggested that reports of such violence documented by the AI 
were not true because Ukrainians were “very tolerant by nature and would never be the ones 
starting  any   fight  or  whatsoever,  unless   if,  maybe   they  were  drunk...   but,   generally  very 
tolerant...” (Personal notes from the meeting, June 2008). The official in this example engaged 
in   what   S.   Cohen   (2002:   101­113)   calls  'implicatory   denial'.  He   implied   that   the   AI 
representatives   did   not   really   understand   what   was   happening   in   Ukraine   and   attributed 




crimes   committed   by   foreigners20  and   the   number   of   crimes   committed   against   them   in 
Ukraine'.  The latter number was lower the General Prosecutor's representative appeared to 
imply that a  supposedly deviant  nature of behaviour of members of  'visible  minorities'   in 
Ukraine   justified   violence   against   them,   which   nonetheless   ‘did   not   happen’.   Thus,   by 
manipulating   the  topos   of   numbers  he   obviously   attempted   to   establish   positive   self­
presentation of the 'in­group' he belongs to by means of counter­offensive (Cohen, 2001: 112) 
against 'visible minorities' who are portrayed 'foreign' to it and 'deviant'.




in   their   country.   Consequently,   the   reality   was   defined   as   a   reality   of   tolerance,   which 
deprived opposition to racism of a legitimate basis (1991: 115). Similar myth of tolerance, as 
shown above, is highly politicised in the dominant discourse on ethnicity in Ukraine, which 





the   documented   cases   of   racist   violence   human   rights   organisations   demanded   the 
Government to take measures to effectively prosecute perpetrators including bringing the law 
in compliance with the standards contained in relevant international human rights instruments, 












was   supposedly   aimed   to   rectify.  No  voice  of   victims  of   racism  is   allowed   to   enter   the 
dominant   discourse   on   racism.   Instead,   adoption   of   this   Law   was   justified   throughout 
preparatory work and parliamentary debates by reference to ‘European standard’ and civil 
society   reports   on   a   number   of   violent   crimes   against   visible   minorities   presumably 
perpetrated by neo­Nazi skinheads. Consequently, the scope of this legislative initiative and its 
potential  effect  is only restricted to cases of a)  manslaughter,  b)  severe bodily injuries,  c) 
bodily injuries of medium severity, d) battery and torment (that did not cause bodily injuries). 
These   types  of  violent  acts  are  perceived  to  be characteristic  outcomes of   racist  violence 
perpetrated by neo­Nazi, and therefore racism as such is attributed only to this marginal sub­
culture.   Such   a   limited   perception   of   the   problem   is   also   reflected   in   range   of   official 
comments by the authorities of Ukraine. Supreme Court of Ukraine critically commending 
this legislative initiative declared: “Ukraine, unlike some other states, is not a country were 
manifestations   of   racism,   chauvinism,   xenophobia   and   anti­Semitism   have   become   a 
widespread, large scale and a threatening phenomenon.” (SCU, 2009)





among   certain   fractions   of   the   civil   society   as   well   as   members   of   ‘visible   minorities’. 
Implications of ‘partial acknowledgement' are well reflected by the results of a survey carried 
out by Kharkiv Institute on Sociological Research among police officers and Police Academy 
students  in  Kharkiv based on Bogardus scale.   It  demonstrated  that   'racists'  were  the most 
intolerable   group   from   the   point   of   view   of   the   current   and   would­be   police   officers. 
Interviewees also indicated, however, that they would only tolerate as guests in the country the 
following   'ethnic'   groups   included   into   the   questionnaire   along   with   'racists':   Chinese, 
Africans, Arabs, Afghans, Roma, Chechens (Kobzin, 2008: 46). 
The fact anti­racist efforts of the civil society resulted only in partial acknowledgement of 




racist  attitudes   through rejection  of   its  extreme manifestations.  By doing so,  a  prejudiced 
individual or an institution does not only feel free in expressing and living out her prejudices, 
but   also   perceives   herself   as   tolerant,   thus   delegitimizing   opposition   to   her   prejudice. 
Moreover, as S. Cohen notes, pro­active responses in the form 'partial acknowledgement' do 
not guarantee prevention of another round of official denial (2001: 115).
To summarise   I   suggest   that  official  discourse  on   racism  in  Ukraine,  even  when  it   is 
seemingly acknowledging  the  problem,  only uses  various  denial   strategies.   Intertwined  in 
pervasive   forms   of   in  implicatory   denial  and  counter­offensive,  partial   acknowledgement 
denial of racism in Ukraine dominates discourse of the state pertaining to this topic. This not 










perpetuate   racism   against   ‘visible   minorities’   in   Ukraine.   It   was   indented   to   serve   as   a 
preliminarily reconnaissance into this problem. In light of the total absence of the research 
devoted to this question I hoped that the findings of this study could be instrumental for both 




















stem   from   the   official   and   implicit   Soviet   ideologies.   These   include   a   range   of   the 











this   discourse   ‘visible   minorities’   are   being,   in   terms   of   P.Essed,   marginalized   and 





one  or   another  capacity  with   ‘migration  management’,   including   the  State  Committee  on 
Nationalities and Religions, the Ministry of Interior and the Border Guard Service. 
 It was suggested following that the only way to oppose perpetuation of racist discourse is a 












their   urge   to   act  (F.Schelling,   from   Taguieff,   2001:   1)  and   review   their   strategies   with 
reference to the root­causes of the problem instead of its symptoms. In order to construct the 
effective response to racism they will have to undertake further research into different facets 


















through   strategic   analysis   of   relevant   state  measures,  but   also   through  provision  of   legal 
support   to   foreign   nationals   and   stateless   persons   to   whom   they   are   applied.   Such   a 
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'perfectly   fine',   one   would   wonder   what   percentage   in   the   number   of   'identified   illegal 
migrants'   constitute  people  who  despite  being   legally   entitled   to  being  documented  were 
deprived   of   such   possibilities   due   to   the   structural   problems   concerning   practical 
implementation of migration and asylum related laws. Such as, individuals referred to by an 








protection   lawyer   at   the  Social  Action  Centre/No  Borders  Project,   I  was   informed   about 
apprehension  of  an  asylum seeker  B.   from Uzbekistan   in  Podil  District  of  Kyiv.  At   that 
moment   B.'s   application   for   asylum   was   rejected   by   the   migration   authorities   and   the 
document certifying his status was seized from him. However, about a month prior to the 





















probably,   even   counted   as   four   'illegal  migrants').  After   all,   it   seems   it   is   precisely   this 



















differ   in   phenotype   from   the   majority   of   population   of   Ukraine.   Thus,   'illegal   migrant' 











we   are  Chechens,   it   is   like   a   stamp   at   the  border”.   (See   also   Levin,   2006   for  multiple 
illustrations of practice of ethnic profiling against Chechens on the border and their effects). 
HRW notes that this kind of denial of entry to Ukraine is practically indiscriminate towards 


















stateless persons to Ukraine,   their  departure,  and transit   through the territory of Ukraine” 




least   limited   guarantees   for   foreign   nationals   and   stateless   persons   (regardless   of   their 
migration status) associated with removal, such as the ECHR (1950), UNCAT (1984), not to 
mention the Refugee Convention (1951).  As an integral part  of  the national  legislation of 
Ukraine these international human rights standards should be directly applicable. However, 
since the removal procedures are not adequately regulated they do not provide a room for 
consideration   of   the   implication   of   these   international   human   rights   standards   when   the 
decision  to   remove a  foreign  national  or  a   stateless  person  from Ukraine  is   taken by  the 
authorities. 
Since   the   civil   society   in   Ukraine   preoccupies   itself   with   the   rights   of   non­nationals 
exclusively when the cases concern potential or recognized refugees under Geneva Convention 
or racist violence by neo­Nazi, information about abuse of human rights occurring in removals 
of   foreign  nationals   or   stateless  persons   largely  escapes  public   attention.  However,   some 
limited  number  of   reports   slip   into  public   informational   space  allowing   to   conclude   that 
official statistical figures under the category 'removed illegal migrants' are an unstable ground 

















































elites,   is   posed   to   the   society   and   'national   security'   by   'visible   minorities',   aka   'illegal 
migrants'.  Here politicians from all  sides of political  spectrum more openly indicated that 
these were 'visible minorities' whom they conceptualised as 'illegal migrants'. This initiative is 
a Draft Law “On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts Concerning Migration” of 18 March 
2008.   Discussion   of   it   in   the   Parliament   of   Ukraine   that   took   place   22   January   2010 
(Parliament, 2010). 
Main target of this Draft Law is the current Law of Ukraine “On the Status of Foreigners 
and Stateless Persons” of 4 February 1994.   The Law constitutes  the main  legislative act 







which is  the failure of  the Law of Ukraine to secure  to  immigrants  their human rights  in 
connection   with   'migration   management'   and   associated   'expulsion'   procedures.   It   is 







institutionalised   racism,   as   analysed   above.   Therefore   it   is   worrying   to   consider   the 































pertaining   to   the  alleged  criminality   of  migrants   also   constitute   a   clear  manipulation,   as 












































nationalists  and capitalists  — it   is  a  question of  national  security,  and consequently,   it   is  a  question which 
concerns vital functions of the citizens of Ukraine. Because everyone perfectly understands, that a problem of 





























'illegal  migration'   that   is   perpetrated  by   the  political   elites   of  Ukraine.  They   testify   that 
repressive   measures   in   ‘migration   management’,   against   which   there   is   no   opposition 
expressed, are intended to target 'visible minorities'. They illustrate several traits of the racist 
discourse,  which structure  the reality of racism in Ukraine.  Among other   they illustrate  a 
picturesque rainbow of  topoi of threat and anxiety  (Wodak & Krzyżanovski, 2009) directed 
against   'visible   minorities'   in   Ukraine.   Portrayal   of   them   in   the   discourse   as   criminals, 
carrying 'atypical diseases' and in general constituting a threat to 'the people of Ukraine' and 





about   the work of  the term  'civilization',   it   is  suggested that  'illegality'  similarly works to 
produce human differentially.  It  constructs  a racialised group associated with this   term as 
illegitimate,  not entitled to human rights and thus,  “dubiously human” (Butler, 2004: 92). 
This,   in   its   turn,   legitimises   exclusion,  discrimination  and  even physical  violence  against 
members of 'visible minority' groups. 
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